Cavalry Training

[LafayetteCCurtis]

In the end...you have to remember the Western way of war. In the East, you whittle them down, whittle them down, whittle them down, and then finally devistate them with your "super weapon," whatever that may be. Which takes a long time, and rarely turns out to be decisive. In the West, the "super weapon" is brought to bear first. Then you whittle away the rest with your less powerful weapons. For a long time, thye mounted knight, and the knightly charge, was Europe's "super weapon." The "super weapon" devistates the nervous center of the opposing force, crippling it. After that, you send in the foot, and they hack the luimbs to pieces.

To borrow a JC phrase: Make sense?

No, it doesn't. It's far too broad a generalization to be useful at all, and demonstrably not true in a number of cases. For example, the English at the battle of Bremule dismounted most of their men-at-arms and received the French cavalry charge with this dismounted formation before throwing in their mounted reserve to finish the French off; what is this if not a "whittling down" approach? And then, what would you make of the massive Persian cavalry charge against Roman/Byzantine lines at the battle of Dara if not a massive opening blow with the Persian "superweapon?"

I'm getting really, really bored of such unnecessary over-generalizations about the "nature of (Wester/Eastern/whatever) warfare," especially if not supported by citations that I can check right back to the sources.

[s_taillebois]

Quite true about the English tendency to dismount their knights and men at arms. Part of that was tactics dictated by logistics however. Horses brought over from England tended to be in less than top condition after the voyage over the channel, and the waits at the channel ports for either embarkation and unloading.

And the French in English controlled areas were less than inspired to provide good riding stock to the English, and such were harder to get by the end of the 100 years war. In part because that war in itself caused the rise of nascent French Nationalism amongst the lower nobility and lower classes and partially because the warfare itself ran the stock down.

And whatever the initial cause the English tactic of fighting dismounted and keeping a calvery researve worked well...if for no other reason it required the English to chose the pitches carefully as they were able to do both at Crecy and Agincourt.

[Benjamin Smith]

To answer the original question:

One big issue is that a solid line of mounted elite warriors with lances just as long or longer than your polearms coming at you at 30-40 kph, is pretty intimidating. It's entirely possible for the infantry to begin to falter even before the knights hit. Yeah you might stop their charge, but the guys in the front rank of that infantry line are going to take casualties at least as bad as those of the knights, probably worse because they likely wouldn't be as well armored. Once the line loses even a little of its solidity it becomes easy prey for heavily armored knights on horseback.

Secondly, later European armies did adopt defenses for their horses, various forms of barding in both mail and plate forms appear throughout Western Europe. Check out a few museum websites to see these. The Met has at least one good example.

Thirdly, some of the time the knights hit the enemy in the flank rather than charging down the middle of the battlefield. People often forget that this is where Henry V had his cavalry at Agincourt so that once the French stalled at the bulwarks they could mop them up.

Fourthly, it didn't always work

[Brandon Paul Heslop]

LC:

No, it doesn't. It's far too broad a generalization to be useful at all, and demonstrably not true in a number of cases. For example, the English at the battle of Bremule dismounted most of their men-at-arms and received the French cavalry charge with this dismounted formation before throwing in their mounted reserve to finish the French off; what is this if not a "whittling down" approach? And then, what would you make of the massive Persian cavalry charge against Roman/Byzantine lines at the battle of Dara if not a massive opening blow with the Persian "superweapon?"

I'm getting really, really bored of such unnecessary over-generalizations about the "nature of (Wester/Eastern/whatever) warfare," especially if not supported by citations that I can check right back to the sources

I believe the difference in our respective arguments is largely one of circumstance. As I said before, I was descibing the knightly charge under optimal conditions. When all is said, it is ultimately a matter of what two opposing forces can afford to do. Do they have the luxury of employing their preferred tactics, or do the terrain, the current state of their forces, their supplies, etc., demand something else?

At Bremule, Henry's forces were mostly composed of Saxon English (who traditionally fought on foot, though there is evidence of English cavalry before 1066 - such as at Stamford Bridge - for example, though this was not hard-and-fast custom amongst them, and there were still fairly strong divisions between Saxon and Norman). The Anglo-Norman barons and their knightly retainers made up but a small fraction of the resources Henry could marshal to his command, essentially forming Henry's reserve forces, (as a large proportion of his fuedal subjects within Normandy were essentailly in open rebellion against Henry's rule there, and were fighting on the side of Louis VI). If Henry had access to a different pool of resources, that battle would probably have gone very differently.

Yes, it's a generalization. That's what it was designed to be. It was merely meant to provide a "mindset," if you will. A picture of the ideal result of the knightly charge. That was not always possible, and it didn't always work. When it was possible, and when it did work, it worked spectacularly. I fear you're reading things into my argument that aren't there, and I cannot account for your tone. But hey, if you're bored, by all means, be bored. I don't have the time, nor the inclination to derail this thread to enter into a long-winded explaination detailing why you're wrong.

Don't like that? Tough.

-B.

[Brandon Paul Heslop]

Secondly, later European armies did adopt defenses for their horses, various forms of barding in both mail and plate forms appear throughout Western Europe. Check out a few museum websites to see these. The Met has at least one good example.

Yes, but how common were such defenses? By the time these defenses began to appear, knights were having trouble being able to afford to equip themselves with the latest armour, let alone their horses. The manufacture and maintenance of their gear was becoming so cost-prohibitive that it precluded even some of the better-off knights from equipping their horses with barding. Further, just because your horse is armoured, are you going to trust in it enough to rush headlong into a hedge of spears, glaives, and what-have-you's?

Thirdly, some of the time the knights hit the enemy in the flank rather than charging down the middle of the battlefield. People often forget that this is where Henry V had his cavalry at Agincourt so that once the French stalled at the bulwarks they could mop them up.

Good point. Not always possible, though.

Fourthly, it didn't always work.

Yes.

-B.

[LafayetteCCurtis]

One big issue is that a solid line of mounted elite warriors with lances just as long or longer than your polearms coming at you at 30-40 kph, is pretty intimidating. It's entirely possible for the infantry to begin to falter even before the knights hit.

Breaking the enemy before contact is the whole point of a cavalry charge!

Thirdly, some of the time the knights hit the enemy in the flank rather than charging down the middle of the battlefield. People often forget that this is where Henry V had his cavalry at Agincourt so that once the French stalled at the bulwarks they could mop them up.

Hmm...that sounds more like the Anglo-Gascon cavalry at Poitiers rather than the English at Agincourt. According to some interpretations of Poitiers, it was the Gascon charge into the French flank that finally broke the third (and largest) French battle.

But, anyway, I agree with the idea that people often overlook the fact that medieval cavalrymen were not reluctant to charge an unprotected flank if they had the chance to do so. After all, this was the reason why medieval infantry spear formations were arrayed in shallow but wide blocks--to stall a flanking move by opposing horsemen.

I believe the difference in our respective arguments is largely one of circumstance. As I said before, I was descibing the knightly charge under optimal conditions. When all is said, it is ultimately a matter of what two opposing forces can afford to do. Do they have the luxury of employing their preferred tactics, or do the terrain, the current state of their forces, their supplies, etc., demand something else?

I'm still not buying it. Show me any proof that the "superweapon first" vs. "superweapon last" was indeed an Eastern/Western phenomenon. Let me have a look at the statistics. Otherwise the generalization doesn't hold water.

At Bremule, Henry's forces were mostly composed of Saxon English (who traditionally fought on foot, though there is evidence of English cavalry before 1066 - such as at Stamford Bridge - for example, though this was not hard-and-fast custom amongst them, and there were still fairly strong divisions between Saxon and Norman). The Anglo-Norman barons and their knightly retainers made up but a small fraction of the resources Henry could marshal to his command, essentially forming Henry's reserve forces, (as a large proportion of his fuedal subjects within Normandy were essentailly in open rebellion against Henry's rule there, and were fighting on the side of Louis VI). If Henry had access to a different pool of resources, that battle would probably have gone very differently.

How do you know that? Are there any scholarly analyses of the Battle of Bremule that actually went so far to actually establish that most of Henry's forces were Saxon? If so, I'd certainly want to know where I can obtain it. Otherwise I wouldn't believe the idea.

Not to mention that I don't see why Anglo-Norman horsemen would have been incapable of dismounting; after all, it's quite possible that a large proportion of William the Conqueror's heavy infantry at Hastings were men-at-arms who had to serve on foot because there was not enough transport for their horses!

Yes, but how common were such defenses? By the time these defenses began to appear, knights were having trouble being able to afford to equip themselves with the latest armour, let alone their horses. The manufacture and maintenance of their gear was becoming so cost-prohibitive that it precluded even some of the better-off knights from equipping their horses with barding. Further, just because your horse is armoured, are you going to trust in it enough to rush headlong into a hedge of spears, glaives, and what-have-you's?

Remember that a formation didn't have to be entirely equipped with plate barding--it seems that the rule among French and Burgundian formations and others based on them was that the gendarmes with barded horses would make up the front ranks and the less well-armored horsemen (and horses) would bulk up the formation in the rear ranks if needed. The barding seemed to be quite effective, too; it rendered the French heavies pretty much immune to crossbows and longbows, and on some occasions it did make the cavalrymen and horses braver in attacking infantry--like in the fight against the Swiss pike squares at Marignano, the numerous cavalry vs. infantry charges at Ceresole, and the famous gendarmes vs. Swiss clash at Dreux (though the last one may be a bit dubious).

[Brandon Paul Heslop]

Breaking the enemy before contact is the whole point of a cavalry charge!

So then what happens when it doesn't work? It's got to be more than some puff-chested bluff. We know that it was.

I'm still not buying it. Show me any proof that the "superweapon first" vs. "superweapon last" was indeed an Eastern/Western phenomenon. Let me have a look at the statistics. Otherwise the generalization doesn't hold water.

Well, that quite a tall order. Although I do find it somewhat ironic that you ask me how I can possibly know that Henry I's forces at Bremule were largely Saxon, whereas mere moments before you demand "statistics" of me on a previous point. Somewhat curious. I could cite dozens of examples, but I really doubt that'd do much (if any) good, as I'm rapidly beginning to suspect that you're simply playing devil's advocate for the hell of it.

So, I'l just confine myself to one example, (though an iconic one): Siege of Nicaea, 1097. The Turks sallied out of their stronghold, and then commenced to attack the Crusaders in their usual method, (and the method employed in surrounding regions): harrassing, wheeling attacks by horse-archers. As was their custom, they were saving their men-at-arms for when the enemy was severely damaged and in disarray.

It didn't work. We know of the superiority of European armours from (later) Arab accounts during Richard's crusade, wherein we are told that there were Crusaders with several arrows stuck in their hauberks, who nonethless continued to march and attack. There's a reason for this: the western mentality towards warfare - get in close and annihilate, (an over-simplifaction, but nonetheless). Incidentally, Richard's march to Acre is another exellent example of the two mentalities, (but of course that doesn't interest you, does it?).

The Crusaders at Nicaea, rather than being slowly whittled-down by the Turkish forces, went right at them in full charge, destroying those in their path and scattering the remainder. Sorry to bore you.
Still not buying it? Great. Don't care.

How do you know that? Are there any scholarly analyses of the Battle of Bremule that actually went so far to actually establish that most of Henry's forces were Saxon? If so, I'd certainly want to know where I can obtain it. Otherwise I wouldn't believe the idea.

How do you know your "statistics," and your "scholarly analyses" are correct? Well as it happens, I do remember reading a surviving quote from Henry I as he was drawing up his forces (in ENGLAND...mostly populated by SAXONS) that he had need of his "honourable English," (meaning Saxons), because his forces in Normandy had turned traitor. I don't remember where I read this, (and I'm sure not about to climb through my mountain of books searching for it for your benefit). But, as a student, I'm sure that you're not too incapable. Find it yourself.

Not to mention that I don't see why Anglo-Norman horsemen would have been incapable of dismounting; after all, it's quite possible that a large proportion of William the Conqueror's heavy infantry at Hastings were men-at-arms who had to serve on foot because there was not enough transport for their horses!

Who said they couldn't? I know I didn't. Again, you're putting words in my mouth. That almost universally doesn't end amicably.

-B.

[s_taillebois]

Another element to all this discussion would be the numbers involved in a massed European cavalry assault. To use Hattin as an example, the Outremer forces were trapped by Saladin between two hills (and blocked from water), which denied them the ability to organize an effective mass charge.
There was a small element which did manage to break through the Muslim lines, but that was because the Muslims had opened a small gap in their lines to let them pass. But that Crusader force was too small to wheel, charge again and effectively widen the temporary gap in the Islamic lines. Once Saladin had reformed that section of his front all the group of Crusaders who did break out could do, was ride back to friendly territory.

In this case, the critical mass of cavalry couldn't be achieved...their superior armor may have allowed that small group of Outremer knights to get out from the encirclement, but it wasn't enough in and of itself to permit them to rescue their comrades.

[Sal Bertucci]

Gentlemen,

As a non-participant in this discussion, I'm going to ask all involved to cool down, or to drop the subject. It is not the purpose of this forum to bicker over such things, so it might be time to move along to something else worth talking about.

[Brandon Paul Heslop]

Another element to all this discussion would be the numbers involved in a massed European cavalry assault. To use Hattin as an example, the Outremer forces were trapped by Saladin between two hills (and blocked from water), which denied them the ability to organize an effective mass charge.
There was a small element which did manage to break through the Muslim lines, but that was because the Muslims had opened a small gap in their lines to let them pass. But that Crusader force was too small to wheel, charge again and effectively widen the temporary gap in the Islamic lines. Once Saladin had reformed that section of his front all the group of Crusaders who did break out could do, was ride back to friendly territory.

In this case, the critical mass of cavalry couldn't be achieved...their superior armor may have allowed that small group of Outremer knights to get out from the encirclement, but it wasn't enough in and of itself to permit them to rescue their comrades.

Totally agree here. No model functions under all conditions, (unfortunately).

-B

[Andrzej Rosa]

I've know that horses won't charge what they perceive to be a solid object so how did people in the middle ages and in ancient times remedy that so that they could make a good charge? can anyone tell me anything? if so please go into detail and use valid reliable sources please

Thanks

I read they (that is Poles, here) used straw dummies. At first they spaced them far apart, so the horse could run between them freely. Later they gradually closed the space, until the horse learned to bash the dummies aside. They even purposefully trained horses to bash dummies aside even if there was place enough.

A war horse was extremely expensive.

[Benjamin Parker]

Can I see the source?