Postby Guest » Tue Dec 10, 2002 12:00 pm
Continued:
By 1520¹s the arquebus¹s success versus cavalry was already attracting attention. The expense of the large targets falling before the gunfire was noted by Blaise de Monluc when he described how early in his career he learned that a small group of arquebusiers could stop a cavalry charge.
I¹d like to point out that this was during a time when many warriors of Spain and other European armies warriors trained in the old ways of sword and shield were not exactly welcome to this new mode of combat. Chevalier Bayard considered it, "devilish" to shoot a knight from a distance using an iron tube, lead slugs and powder. Chevalier made it a point to hang a prisoner on the spot who found carrying a firearm. (The Story of Weapons and Tactics- Wittingham)
FORMATION
Initial formations of pike and arquebus phalanx involved the arquebusiers at the corners of the square. TEST OF WILL is evident in the unbroken formation as it evolved in the Spanish Tercios formations at Rocroi. Pike formations were drilled to support the volley of the Arquebusiers. One such formation involved the pikemen allowing a yard or so of room between themselves to enable arquebusiers to move within the formation.
Magellan¹s death illustrates that the pike and shot men could hold back the natives long enough to sustain the battle at long range for nearly an hour. Once the natives closed, the sheer numbers overwhelmed the pikemen so quickly that Magellan could not even deploy his sword in time. The mode of combat was reliant on static defense and the weakness was that once broken, the larger number of closing enemy (of which the defense was specifically designed for ) would collapse the formation and force retreat or eventually kill the men in the broken modified phalanx. Magellan ordered his men to retreat as did other Spanish officers in several engagements years later in Mindanao.
The same weakness was apparent when Spanish officers would follow the retreating natives and break the arquebus/pike phalanx in attempts to rout the natives. Often they fell prey to the natives¹ own mode of ambush. Sheer dominance of native forces in the Philippines would already have swayed the tide if they were able to close the pike and gun formations. These Spanish officers were still fighting as they had trained in the older methods of combat. A significant transition of how battle was fought and how officers were trained happened during this time period. Other officers trained or aware of the weaknesses of the phalanx stayed and held the formation. They lived or died by the confidence or nerves in their formations or fortifications
"This was not only because the pikemen was central to battlefield tactics but also because the solidarity as a social group was critical to their very ability to operate in battle. Pikes had to withstand the efforts to break their ranksŠ in the ability to remain coherent and effective under the strains of battle was a function of the morale, training and discipline of the pikemen." Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe, Hall Spanish Tercios had to create an artificial comradeship due to the structure of their army, whether by religion or other means.
My own POV is that if the Spaniards resorted to the sword it was an admittance of a failure of the phalanx as it was used in their day. For a pikeman to abandon his long weapon, it would involve his fellow pikemen ( drilled to attack in unison) not able to support his fellow soldier. A well drilled group of pikemen and arquebusiers could take on or repel a cavalry charge in open field, or a charge of enemy when covered in natural fortifications and their own static defense. Resorting to HTH combat of the sword and buckler variety would only be tactically viable if the enemy numbers were equal or less. Too much relied in maintaining their number in a faraway land. Hard fought lessons learned decades past revealed the weakness of engaging a superior force rushing towards you when the ability to adapt and engage the battle on a separate level can supply a victory. Their own records displayed that using an advancing force of native allies wielding HTH weapons to rout or close signalled many positive outcomes. Magellan would have done well to have the native allies close in once Lapu Lapu and his men began to converge to the range of HTH. Magellan was however, in the midst of how warfare was evolving. Legaspi and Spanish troops that followed had more hindsight to draw from.
An Artillery Sub branch began to enlarge within the Spanish military. Spain¹s Prince Phillip II created a system of justice under the council of war just for the artillery. Gunners, Metal Founders, Superintendents of Artillery came into being.
By 1537, a mathematical treatise on calculating the trajectory of shot was already in existence. By 1586, Collado provided a practical manual for the artilleryman. By the 1620¹s HTH combat skills in military education gave way to the study of ballistics, siege tactics, formation studies, leadership and the use of campaign mapping. By 1590¹s the continuous shots (volley fire) was already a documented drill for arquebusiers. One such drill involved six ranks , as one rank fired it retreated to the rear as the second rank took it¹s place and so on.
The Introduction letter to Legaspi commented on the importance of arquebus drill and practice, as many in Europe were learning- repetition and familiarity bred confidence in this new eapon and form of combat Swiss and Spanish pikemen had their own drills years prior to the emergence of the 1607 Jacob de Gheyn Dutch drill manual for pikemen and arquebusiers (Wapenhandelinghe van Roers). This drill became a standard practice.
Military drill and formations during the 16th century used manuals such as the revised Vegetius¹ De Re Militari in 1585, Lipsius¹ 1595 De Militia Romana, Cruso¹s Instructions, Bingham¹s Tactics of Aelian and Hexham¹s Principles of the art of Militare.
The Spanish Œhollow rectangle¹ proved to be a succesful tactic vs. the French in 1643. Eventually the pike role diminished into a support role to the arquebusier. By 1650 even Pikemen numbers as stated earlier declined and by 1705 eventually faded away. By 1647, Puysegur¹s plug bayonet displayed the use of the gun as a hybrid pike. The evolution into the ring bayonet made the pike obsolete. The kris in the hands of a suicidal Moro relied mostly on sheer fanaticism in the face of overwhelming firepower. Once the Colt¹s stopping power was adjusted to address the charging Moro, this mode of attack and way of combat spoke more on the tenacity of the fighters rather than their practicality.
"It is impossible to learn the right use of weapons without at the same time learning tactics." The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, Col. Dupuy.
"On the battlefield, Close Quarter fighting, the prime objective of the Medieval Knight gradually gave way to longer range musketry duels. In 1598, one English writer commented that it is rarely seen in our days that men come often to blows as in the old times they did." Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe, Hall.
As the gun evolved further, eventually these formations of tightly grouped soldiers advancing methodically upon the unorganized enemy suffered massive losses in infantry hundreds of years later. Volley fire weakness introduced the line formation, abandoning the psychological reassurance of a pike phalanx formation. Tightly lined formation met another tightly formed formation with both sides possessing faster loading, more powerful guns and capable of longer ranges of fire. We¹ve all seen films or reenactments of troops falling in a hail of gunfire while they steadily advanced.
Spain¹s Prince Philip II knew the importance of modern warfare, but the consequences of maintaining an effort of subjugation disproportionate to the empire¹s resources, overwhelmed him, his countrymen and his place in history. It led Spain to worse actions. One biographer states," History has shown itself severe towards this Prince" Under his rule Spain alienated the nations in which the following centuries were to shape and inspire public opinion such as Holland, England and France. It¹s subjugation of the Americas, colonization of the Philippines and battles with future super powers to come. Philip was caught between the past and the future and he eventually personified the Spanish Empire¹s greatest triumphs, weakness and demise.
Recommended sources:
The Story of Weapons and Tactics- Wittingham
Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, Col. Dupuy
Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe, Hall
War and Society in Early Modern Europe 1495- 1715, Tallett
Firepower- Hughes
Phillip II- The First Modern King, Mariejol
