LafayetteCCurtis wrote:By the late 1620s there were cases of cavalry charges (by the excellent Polish hussars no less) being repelled almost solely by the firepower of well-drilled Shot.
From Radoslaws Sikora's review of Richard Brezenski's work
Radoslaws Sikora wrote:On August 3, 1622 in the vicinity of Courland's town of Mitawa/Mittau the armies of Krzysztof Radziwiłł and Gustavus Adolphus clashed. Vanguard of the Swedish army consisted of several (3 or 4) reiter cornets/companies. They placed themselves at the forest's edge, "in the thickets, past the swamps" in such manner so the Lithuanian horse could not attack them. In van of these reiters came two canons, "and they fired from them against our banners/companies but by God's grace without any harm." Then, the commander of the Lithuanian reiters, Jerzy Krzysztof Rożen, with the hetman's permission sent a trumpeter to the Swedish reiters, "challenging them to take to the field unless they were sons-of-the-bitches." Swedes did not show any interest in such presented proposition. Instead of awaited cavalry action "several companies of (enemy) infantry rushed out from the forest.". Hetman directed against them three rota/companies of haiduk infantry. The firefight raged between the infantries of both sides. "Very laud musket gunplay lasted for an entire hour, as in a regular battle it would not have been greater." There were some 20 haiduks killed (and fell into the enemy's hands) while wounded there were some 30 more. When the servants "that on a hillock were digging a trench (entrenchment), being afraid of the gunplay, started to flee with their spades," Swedes, "understanding that these were the soldiers who were fleeing, sent to their own a larger reinforcement, and in such manner more than 2000 Swedish infantrymen jumped our throats and onto the hillock pushed."
Radziwiłł turned then to the JK Rożen's reiter companies (those were three companies, on register numbering 500-horse strong but their real strength was merely 300 horses) "so they would aid the infantry," but they evasively "said that they had no field" (the ground was not suitable for cavalry) and " replied that winged hussars should rush first." Why they refused? Reiters were foreigners that fought for a profit and not out of patriotic call. The Lithuanian army had serious financial problems at that time and was seriously behind the pay for their soldiers. In face of serious numerical advantage held by the enemy, when the motivation to continue fighting was not strong enough, when the ground was not favorable, all that was enough that the reiters refused to execute command. In such circumstances hetman turned then to the Janusz Ulik Szweryn's hussaria (on the register this unit had 200 horses, the real strength of this unit is unknown). But they also refused to charge. Why? The sources known to us do not explain this. One thing is certain - there is no mention in the sources about any winged hussars' fear of the gunfire of the Swedish infantry. These source suggest that, when faced with numerically superior adversary (just Swedish infantry alone was supposed to be 2000-3000), and having the ground unsuitable for cavalry action and - what may be the most important - the winged hussars seeing that they would not be supported by the reiters (after all those already had refused to attack), then the morale of Szweryn's hussaria must have been weak. Their commander did not decide to charge under such conditions. Thus meeting with another refusal there, Radziwiłł then turned to the next reiter company - Henryk Szmeling (200 horses on the register). Yet and this reiter company refused to carry out the command.
This crisis, however, did not spread throughout the entire Lithuanian army. Unfortunately, "other [companies] albeit willing [to fight] their own places in the army's battle order had to guard, because the enemy horse with part of the infantry in the affair [battle order] stood fast, awaiting our confusion." In these circumstances, before the Lithuanian battle order regrouped, before those 'willing' companies arrived onto the field, the Swedes were able to take the hillock with the Lithuanian artillery pieces there.
Ultimately the Lithuanian hussaria charged those ( troops). There were found "two so righteous hussaria companies" that "while the ground was not for a hussar (undesirable for winged hussars)" yet "in the very fire of the enemy troops they rushed" and "great injury in them they caused." Those companies were: the Połock voivode Janusz Kiszka's company, on the register 200 hussars, and the referendarz of Grand Dutchy of Lithuania Aleksander Korwin Gosiewski's company, of the same register's number. This charge proved to be successful. Hussars, in spite that they were attacking on the ground not quite suitable for cavalry action, withstood the fire of more numerous infantry and passed through its lines, inflicting heavy causalities on the Swedes. It was not, however, the end of fighting. Winged hussar companies "having broken through and without reinforcement remaining, could not turn around." Swedes brought onto the battlefield additional infantry units, position them in the thickets and in the trenches (including the entrenchment dig out by the Lithuanian servants) and maintained their positions, because on such prepared infantry "the cavalry second time could not joust (strike)."
The very charge on the fire-spewing lines of the Swedish infantry cost our winged hussars 2 killed (Nakurski and Orwid) and unknown quantity of wounded, while "in the horses not a small injury they caused." The Swedes were supposed to have died "close to 500" on this day. Some of quoted number included that infantry, which had been under Lithuanian infantry fire before the hussaria's charge.
BTW about Ceresole, Ravenna and Dreux, Check out Oman's Art of war in the 16th century. Yes it was published in 1937 but it holds its own against modern scholarship.